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Abstract: Understanding whether and how corruption impacts firm productivity in China is crucial 
for promoting good governance of economic development. Based on our econometric model 
developed with China’s firm-level data, including detailed firm heterogeneity information and 
provincial records of government official-related corruption, we confirm that corruption acts as 
“sand” rather than “grease” in the wheels of firm productivity improvement. The hampering effect 
of corruption on firm productivity is not obvious for state-owned, relatively large-sized, and low 
productive firms, but it is quite significant for private, relatively small-sized, and high productive 
ones. More importantly, we find that a firm’s productivity gains from import liberalization are 
significantly inhibited by corruption. Therefore, if the institutional environment can be improved, 
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1. Introduction 
Most developing countries are troubled by serious domestic corruption and slow economic growth 
(Mauro, 1995; Svensson, 2005). However, as the biggest developing country and the second largest 
economy, China has—paradoxically, it seems—enjoyed rapid economic growth coupled with a 
relatively high level of corruption, becoming the principal model for the “East Asian Paradox” 
(Rock & Bonnett, 2004). According to the Corruption Perceptions Index 1  published by 
Transparency International, China is perceived as a fairly corrupt country, ranking 43rd out of 44 
economies in 1995 (between Pakistan and Indonesia), 63rd out of 90 economies in 2000 (between 
Thailand and Egypt), 78th out of 158 economies in 2005 (between Laos and Morocco), 78th out of 
178 economies in 2010 (between Vanuatu and Colombia), and 77th out of 180 economies (equally 
ranked with Serbia and Suriname) in 2017. Meanwhile, similar to Krugman’s critics with respect to 
other East Asian economies, China’s extraordinary record of economic growth without “exceptional 
efficiency growth” has been doubted (Krugman, 1994; Yong, 2000, 2003). For example, there is 
some evidence suggesting that China did garner high productivity growth in its manufacturing 
sectors, especially after entering the World Trade Organization (WTO) (Holz, 2006; Perkins & 
Rawski, 2008; Brandt et al., 2012, 2017).  
Is China unique among nations in a way that corruption may not hinder its economic efficiency? 
Does the corruption in China “grease” rather than “sand” the wheels of firms’ productivity 
improvement2? Given what we know through massive empirical studies on the impact of corruption 
for many countries, the answer might be “No.” For example, Mauro (1995), Wei (1997), Kaufmann 
and Wei (1999), Fisman and Svensson (2007), and Nguyen and van Dijk (2012) have shown the 
negative impacts of corruption on economic growth, business development, firms being driven to 
unofficial economy, public expenditures, domestic and foreign investments, and firms’ management 
time and cost of capital. However, for China, the answer may be a bit more complicated given that 
China is a transition economy with great social and economic complexities. For example, Wang and 
You (2012) argued that corruption in China appears to substitute for underdeveloped financial 
markets as a means to release constraints and thus contribute to firms’ growth. Jiang and Nie (2014) 
portray a similar story that corruption in fact helps private firms in China circumvent unproductive 
government regulations, enabling access to import and export businesses and thus allowing them to 
generate more profits. Contrary to these findings pertaining to China, Cai et al. (2011) show that 
while some kinds of involvement with corruption can help firms obtain better government services 
or lower taxation that may bring positive returns, the overall effect of corruption on firm productivity 
is negative. However, the data used by Cai et al. (2011) are quite limited in both number of 
observations and sample scope (three different small-scale surveys’ data are pooled together, 
making the sample less general; especially the second survey that was only conducted in 1 of 31 
provinces in mainland China, covering 1,070 firms). At the same time, their conclusion may be 
biased to some extent due to their choice of a proxy for the level of corruption, which was based on 
the firm’s entertainment and travel expenditures without direct information regarding the reality of 
corruption itself. Moreover, the key firm-level corruption measure “entertainment and travel 
expenditures” are observed for only one year per firm in the dataset, making causal inferences 
difficult. Given the limitation in the existing studies as mentioned above, the first purpose of this 
paper is to provide a better understanding about whether and how corruption impacts firm 
productivity in China. This is crucial to review the so-called “East Asian Paradox” and “Efficient 
Grease” hypotheses, which can help improve policymaking for healthy and sustainable economic 
development. 
Additionally, a large body of literature has shown that firms may improve productivity through 
various channels including taking advantage of good policies externally, such as import 
liberalization—mainly represented by tariff reductions (Lu et al., 2010; Brandt et al., 2012, 2017; 
Yu, 2015; Dai et al., 2016). However, very little research has paid attention to clarifying how and to 
what extent factors in the institutional environment, such as corruption, impact firm productivity 
through the channels of import liberalization. Hsieh and Klenow (2009) found that TFP (Total Factor 
Productivity) in developing countries such as China and India is always inhibited by resource 
misallocation. Their conclusion provides a bridge to consider how corruption influences firm TFP 
                                                        
1 https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2017 
2 For the details concerning the so-called “Effective Grease” hypothesis, see Kaufmann and Wei (1999). 
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as corruption is considered one of the main factors causing resource misallocation (Nguyen & van 
Dijk, 2016; Liu et al., 2015). Edmond et al. (2015) showed that international free trade can reduce 
the misallocations by increasing competition, while domestic institutions weakened the effects of 
trade liberalization. Further, evidence from China shows that productivity gains could be increased 
by improving domestic trade managing institutions even under export quota policies (Khandelwal 
et al., 2013). Furthermore, based on Indian firm-level data, Topalova and Khandelwal (2011) found 
that firm productivity is further increased from import liberalization in industries with weak 
domestic regulations. Ahsan (2013) also found that contract enforcement and judicial efficiency 
play important roles in firm productivity, when gaining from import liberalization. Given the 
importance of the impact of import liberalization on firm productivity, the second purpose of the 
paper is to investigate whether the effect of import liberalization on firm productivity could be 
influenced by corruption. Discussion on this issue has critical policy implications. Import 
liberalization, such as tariff reduction, easily reaches a ceiling at some point, as does its marginal 
impact on firm productivity. If it is true that corruption significantly crowds out the positive impact 
of import liberalization on firm productivity, this implies that even if there is no more room to 
increase import liberalization (e.g., a country has a high level of import liberalization or is facing 
serious challenges from trade protectionists), reducing the level of corruption can still help import 
liberalization release more positive impacts on firm productivity.  
 Compared to the data used in the extant literature about corruption, the Chinese firm-level data 
used in this paper covers all state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-SOEs whose annual sales 
exceed RMB 5 million in China, with detailed information about firm heterogeneity, such as firm 
ownership, firm size, and export patterns. The dataset is most widely used by scholars (Hsieh & 
Klenow, 2009; Brandt et al., 2012, 2017; Yu et al., 2015). For the corruption level, we use direct 
information coming from the official statistics on corruption cases published in China Procuratorial 
Yearbook, government audit data from China Audit Yearbook, and information on personal 
characteristics of the main anti-corruption bureau leaders from officials’ resumes. 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe our dataset 
measures and present descriptive statistics. In Section 3, we present our strategies for empirical 
analyses. In Section 4, we report and explain the regression results, and in Section 5, we conclude 
our findings and offer some policy implications. 
2. Data and Measures 
2.1. Data Resources 
To investigate the impact of corruption on firm productivity, we relied on the following panel 
datasets spanning from 1998 to 2007: firm-level production data, provincial corruption data, and 
product-level trade data. 
 
2.1.1. Annual Survey of Industrial Production (ASIP) Data 
We use the data for Chinese industrial manufacturing production from the ASIP for 1998–2007, 
which includes information for all SOEs and non-SOEs with annual sales above 5 million RMB 
(about US $630,000 at the 2006 exchange rate or US $760,000 at the 2018 exchange rate). The 
dataset was collected through annual surveys administered by the National Bureau of Statistics of 
China and discussed in detail in Brandt et al. (2014). On average, more than 200,000 firms per year 
from 1998 to 2007 are included in the dataset, spanning 480 four-digit-manufacturing industries and 
31 provinces or province-equivalent municipalities. The aggregate value of exports, output, 
employment, sales, and capital for these firms are nearly equal to the totals reported annually in 
China’s Statistical Yearbook. Compared to the universe of firms observed in the 2004 China 
Economic Census, our sample of above-scale industrial firms represents the lion’s share of industrial 
production in China. As with Brandt et al. (2017), these firms accounted for 91% of gross output, 
71% of employment, 97% of exports, and 91% of total fixed assets in 2004. During the sample 
period, Chinese Industry Classification (CIC) codes changed in 2002, which were identified as 
GB/T4754-2002 and were applied from 2003. Before 2003, an older version (GB/T4754-1994), set 
in 1994, was applied. We converted the old CIC version (GB/T4754-1994) into the new one 
(GB/T4754-2002) using Dean and Lovely (2010)’s concordance. We utilized information on firms’ 
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registered type (variable dengji zhuce leixing) to construct ownership categories.3 As with Brandt 
et al. (2017), if a firm had mixed ownerships, we assigned the category with the largest ownership 
share in registered capital. Firms are divided into three categories: state-owned, foreign-invested, 
and privately owned, wherein foreign-invested firms included subsidiaries of firms from Hong Kong, 
Macao, or Taiwan, along with wholly invested-foreign enterprises and joint ventures with local 
governments (JVs). 
 
2.1.2. Provincial Corruption Data 
We used filed corruption cases as a proxy for the provincial corruption level of mainland China. 
Both the number of registered cases and the number of registered cases of corruption per hundred 
public officials were utilized. The corruption cases documented by the Supreme People’s 
Procuratorate of China in the Procuratorial Yearbook of China were the only panel data available 
on corruption in China. The filed cases were negatively related with usual anti-corruption indexes, 
such as expenditure by local government on police, procuratorate, court, and judiciary, which 
qualified them as proxies for the degree of corruption in China (Dong & Torgler, 2013; Jiang & Nie, 
2014). Similar measures had been adopted in previous studies about the U.S. (Fisman & Gatti, 2002; 
Glaeser & Saks, 2006) and Italy (Del Monte & Papagni, 2007). To deal with the potential measures 
of error and possible endogenous problems in regressions, data of government audits targeted at 
inspecting illegal or irregular behavior of government departments and information of key 
provincial anti-corruption bureau leaders were collected, especially from the Provincial Secretary 
of the Committee for Discipline Inspection, e.g., work experience, position in the Communist Party 
system, etc., as instrument variables for the corruption index. The raw data was collected mostly 
from the Chinese Party and Government Leading Cadres Database4 and partially from China’s 
search engine giant, Baidu (a Chinese version of Google). 
 
2.1.3. Product-level Trade Data 
Tariff data was available directly from the WTO and the trade analysis and information system. 
China’s tariff data were available at the harmonized system (HS) six-digit disaggregated level for 
1998–2007. Following Brandt et al. (2017), we map the six-digit level of the HS product 
classification into the CIC system at the four-digit level, to correspond with the product-level tariff 
data for analysis.  
2.2. Measures 
2.2.1. TFP 
Our key dependent variable is the firm-level TFP. Two classical approaches have been popular and 
widely used to calculate firm-level TFP. Olley and Pakes (1996) developed an approach that 
measured TFP by its investment function (OP method). Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) developed 
another approach that estimated the TFP by its intermediate input function (LP method). However, 
these two approaches have been identified as suffering from functional dependence problems, e.g., 
the labor function depending on other key factors (Ackerberg et al., 2015). 
To avoid such problems, we applied the ACF method (developed by Ackerberg, Caves, and 
Frazer 2015) to estimate firm-level TFP. The main difference between ACF method and OP or LP 
approaches is that ACF inverts “conditional” rather than “unconditional” input demand functions to 
control for unobserved productivity. Consequently, coefficients on variable inputs, e.g., labor, do 
not have to be identified in the first stage and all coefficients will be estimated in the second stage, 
avoiding the functional dependence issues in the LP/OP first stage. 
 
2.2.2. Corruption 
One of our key independent variables is the provincial corruption proxy, which can be represented 
by either filed corruption cases or filed corruption cases per hundred public officials. The corruption 
cases filed include embezzlement and bribery. During our sample period of 1998–2007, all the 
embezzlement or bribery with an amount above 5,000 Chinese yuan shall be filed and investigated 
                                                        
3 Stipulations on how to distinguish firm ownerships between registered types can be found in the website of 
China’s NBS: http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/tjbz/200610/t20061018_8657.html. 
4 http://ldzl.people.com.cn 
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by the procuratorate according to the law. According to the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic 
of China, a state functionary who, by taking his office to take public money or property into his own 
possession, and any person authorized by State organs, State-owned companies, enterprises, 
institutions, or people’s organizations to administer and manage State-owned property who, by 
taking his office illegally takes said property into his own possession shall be regarded as being 
guilty of embezzlement. Additionally, any State functionary who takes advantage of his position to 
extort money or property from another person, or illegally accepts another person’s money or 
property in return for securing benefit for the person, and any State functionary who, in economic 
activities, violates State regulations by accepting rebates or services charges of various description 
and taking into his own possession shall be regarded as guilty of acceptance of bribes. In addition, 
for avoiding the potential endogeneity problems caused by using this variable, three instrument 
variables (the amount of violations identified in government audits, provincial anti-corruption 
bureau leaders’ previous experience in anti-corruption institution, and position in provincial 
government) were selected based on the government audit data and the main anti-corruption leaders’ 
experiences. 
 
2.2.3. Import Liberalization 
Two kinds of measures are used to capture the effect of import liberalization on firm TFP. First, 
import tariff at the CIC4 (the four-digit) industry level, both input and output import tariffs, are 
calculated5. Intuitively, the lower the industry import tariffs, the higher the import liberalization. 
Second, imports at the firm level, such as total imports, imports for intermediate goods, capital 
goods, raw materials, and household consumption goods are identified by the UNSD’s classification 
of Broad Economic Categories. 
The definitions and measures of other variables can be found in Table 1. The statistical features 
of sample are shown in Table 2. 
 
Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here. 
 
3. Empirical Specification 
To investigate the effects of corruption on firm productivity, the following empirical framework as 
a benchmark model is considered: 
 
1it pt i p j t itTFP Corruptionβ ε ε ε ε ε= + + + + ∗ +Xβ  (1) 
 
The dependent variable is firm-level TFP which is computed by the above-mentioned ACF method. 
Provincial filed corruption cases per hundred local officials (CRPTR) are used as corruption 
indexes6. iε , pε , and j tε ε×  stand for time-invariant firm fixed effect, provincial fixed effect, 
and time-variant two-digit industry fixed effect. X stands for control variables.  stands for 
random errors of individual firm. To investigate the mechanism of corruption on firm productivity, 
Equation (1) was extended by including concerned intermediate variables on the right side, such as 
industry-level tariffs and different types of firm-level imports (imports for intermediate goods and 
capital goods and their interaction terms with corruption indexes). Consistent with Bertrand et al. 
(2004) and Amiti and Konings (2007), standard errors were clustered at the firm level to deal with 
the potential heteroscedasticity and serial autocorrelation.  
 
                                                        
5 Please see Brandt et al. (2017) for the detailed method of computing China’s input and output tariff at four-digit 
CIC level.  
6 Total corruption cases have been employed in the analysis, and the results are robust. However, total corruption 
cases are related with the number of officials in the province. CRPTR will be better to capture the true level of 
corruption. 
itε
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4. Estimation Results 
4.1. Baseline Results 
4.1.1. Average Effect 
Table 3 reports the baseline relationship between domestic corruption and the TFP of manufacturing 
firms in China. Fixed effect at the firm, province, and two-digit industry levels by year are controlled, 
and standard errors are clustered at the firm level in all regressions. Columns (1)–(3) present the 
results of provincial corruption cases per hundred local officials (CRPTR) on firm TFP. All results 
show that corruption has a statistically negative effect on firm-level TFP. After controlling the firm’s 
industrial value added (IVA), the results of the firm’s capital–labor ratio (KLR) and new products 
(NEW)7 , which are significantly related to the firm-level TFP, stay robust. The coefficient of 
corruption is stable around −0.02, which means a 1% increase of corruption will reduce the firm-
level TFP by 0.02 on average; this also means a 1.86% loss at the mean value of the firm TFP. 
Overall, the firm IVA, capital–labor ratio, and new products have a positive effect on firm TFP. The 
result with corruption measured by filed corruption cases are reported in Appendix Table 1.  
 
Insert Table 3 about here 
 
4.1.2. Ownership Heterogeneity 
 
First, firms with different ownership types may behave differently in their performance for various 
probabilities in either confronting or suffering from corruption. China’s transition from a centrally 
planned, dominated economic system to a market economy complicated the relationship between 
the government and the firms. SOEs forged embedded and enduring relationships with local 
governments, which may protect them from market obstacles and government intervention. Usually, 
they enjoy some privileged access to resources in underdeveloped markets. The Chinese 
government usually serves foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) as honored guests as local 
governments prioritize attracting FDI (foreign direct investment) and must compete with each other 
to attract the investment. However, privately owned enterprises (POEs) are considered to have some 
disadvantages in the relationship with the government and in accessing resources or markets (Brandt 
& Li, 2003; Cull et. al, 2015; Ge & Qiu, 2007). Table 4 presents the results of corruption’s effect on 
performance of firms with different kinds of ownership. The coefficients of corruption are negative 
in all columns, but only significant for POEs and FIEs. The coefficient of FIEs is −0.013, the 
magnitude of which is smaller than half of POEs’ −0.033. The result with corruption measured by 
filed corruption cases for different types of firm are reported in Appendix Table 2, which stays robust. 
On average, the results show that the TFP of SOEs suffers little; even FDI is welcomed by local 
governments in China, and the TFP of FIEs accepts negative effects from corruption. This result 
helps explain why multinationals investing in China prefer to invest in those regions that have lower 
level of government corruption (Du et. al, 2008). Even in such a fast-growing economy, POEs suffer 
the most from corruption. On average, the TFP loss from a 1% increase in government corruption 
of the POEs is twice those of the FIEs. Moreover, the coefficients of firm IVA are significantly 
positive for POEs and FIEs but significantly negative for the SOEs. Given China’s imperfect market 
economy, this means the expanding of non-SOEs positively affects productivity, whereas the 
expanding of SOEs negatively affects productivity. The coefficients of the capital–labor ratio and 
new products are positive but not significantly in some regressions.  
 
Insert Table 4 about here 
 
                                                        
7 Because of the missing data problem of firm R&D during 1998–2000 and 2002–2004 in the dataset, firm new 
products data is used to control the R&D effect, which is only missing in 2004. To ensure the proxy will not bias 
the results, the subsample data with full R&D data is also analyzed. The regression results controlling firm R&D 
are in Appendix Table 5. The results are robust. 
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4.2. Endogeneity Issues 
Dummy variables for firms, provinces, and two-digit industries×years are controlled to remedy 
potential problems of endogeneity. The results are robust; however, there are still potential 
endogeneity problems that might contaminate the results in two ways. First, there may be some 
missing variables that cannot be remedied by fixed effects. Second, reverse causality problem may 
make our findings ambiguous. To clear up these concerns, we apply IV regressions. China’s political 
system is characterized with top-down controls and supervision. Key local leaders such as mayors 
and party secretaries are nominated, supervised, and evaluated by the upper-level leaders. Their 
career concerns depend on the evaluations and connections in the bureaus (Jia et al., 2015; Li & 
Zhou, 2005). Therefore, regional corruption should be highly related with political supervision. Two 
kinds of instrumental variables are selected in the paper.  
First, the amount of violation identified in government Audits. The National Audit Office of 
China and its provincial branches regularly audit the departments and affiliations of local 
governments every year. The number of units audited and violations identified in the government 
audits of each province are recorded in the China Audit Yearbook series. Empirical studies show 
that increased audits will reduce government corruption (Olken, 2007), and releasing the audit 
reports of local governments publicly has been proven to be a good measure to monitor government 
corruption in Brazil (Ferraz & Finan, 2008). According to the official introductions, the audit system 
of China shoulders the duty of monitoring the government branches and key government leaders to 
maintain regularity and avoid corruption. We believe that the amount of violation identified in audits 
is correlated with corruptions and exogenous with firm’s behavior, which qualifies them to be 
instrument variables for the provincial corruption indexes.  
Second, two dummy variables coded from anti-corruption leaders’ (the Provincial Secretary of 
the Committee for Discipline Inspection) characteristics. The Committee for Discipline Inspection 
is one key supervisory institution for officials, tasked with enforcing internal rules and regulations 
and combating corruption and malfeasance in the Communist Party. As the vast majority of officials 
at all levels of government are also Communist Party members, the commission is, in practice, the 
anti-corruption body in China. The leaders of such institutions have great influence on local 
corruption. Thus, information from every in-office Provincial Secretary of Committee for Discipline 
Inspection (PSCDI) was collected for the sample period, such as work experience and position in 
the provincial government, as instrument variables for the corruption index. The secretaries are 
mainly nominated, appointed, and evaluated by the upper-level Committee for Discipline 
Inspections. The characteristics of these secretaries have great influence on local anti-corruption 
policies and enforcements but no direct influence on the local firms’ behavior. This qualifies the 
coded information of PSCDI as instrument variables for the provincial corruption indexes. Two 
dummy instrument variables were generated. DS, a dummy variable, equals 1 if the secretary serves 
as Deputy Secretary of the Provincial Party Committee at the same time and 0 if not. The double 
positions mean more power in inspecting corruptions. Experience, another dummy variable, equals 
1 if the secretary’s work experience is mainly in the supervisory department before taking the 
position and 0 if not. Experience may influence the effect of corruption inspection. 
We apply TSLS regressions with each instrument separately. For brevity, we report the results 
with Audits as IVs in the text and report the results with dummy IVs in the appendix. Table 5 reports 
the results of the first-stage regressions with the amount of violations identified in audits as IV. 
Columns (1)–(4) in Table 5 show that instrumental variables are significantly and negatively related 
with corruption cases averaged by the number of local officials. Consistent with the existing 
literature, the results of the first-stage regressions confirm that government audits help reduce 
corruptions (Olken, 2007). F-test values much larger than 10 signify the validity of IVs.  
 
Insert Table 5 about here 
 
Table 6 reports results of the second-stage regressions with the Audits as IVs. For all kinds of 
firms pooled together, Column (1) shows that the coefficient of corruption index is significantly 
negative, while its magnitude is larger than those of OLS regression results in Table 3. For the SOEs, 
Column (2) shows that the coefficient of corruption index is negative but not significant with firm 
TFP, similar to the result in Table 4. For the POEs, Column (3) shows that the coefficient of the 
corruption index is significantly negative, while the magnitude is larger than those of OLS 
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regression results in Table 4. For the FIEs, Column (4) shows that that coefficient of corruption 
index is significantly negative, while the magnitude is larger than those of OLS regression results 
in Table 4. In Table 6, the magnitude of coefficient of corruption index in Column (4) is smaller 
than those in Column (3). The results of IV regressions confirm the results in baseline regressions. 
The results with the Audits as IVs are essentially robust when filed corruption cases are used that 
are reported in Appendix Table 3 and Appendix Table 4 for first-stage and second-stage regressions, 
respectively. 
Therefore, corruption causes significantly negative effects on firm TFP, the SOEs suffer little, 
the FIEs suffer in some degree, and the POEs suffer the most. The results are confirmed in Appendix 
Table 6 with DS as IV and in Appendix Table 7 with Experience as IV. The results are robust. 
The results of IV regressions also confirm that the coefficients of IVA of SOEs are significantly 
negative. On average, the expanding of SOEs has a negative effect on firm TFP, whereas the 
expanding of the non-SOEs has a positive effect. The coefficients confirm that the capital–labor 
ratio and new products or R&D have positive effects on TFP. 
 
Insert Table 6 about here 
 
4.3. Effects with More Firm Heterogeneity Information 
4.3.1. Exporting Status 
The existing studies have found that differences in productivity may exist between exporters and 
non-exporters, between domestic and foreign-invested firms, and among firms in different sectors 
(Bernard et al., 1999; Blalock & Gertler, 2004; Brandt et al., 2017; Dai et al., 2016; Lu et al., 2010). 
We group the firms by exporting or non-exporting to investigate the effects of corruption on firm 
TFP. The results with Audits as IV in regressions are reported in Table 7. Columns (1) and (2) in 
Table 7 show that the coefficients of corruption are significantly negative, and the magnitudes are 
close to the results in the IV regressions on pooled data reported in Table 6. Our observations show 
that neither exporting nor non-exporting firms are safe from corruption.  
 
Insert Table 7 about here 
 
4.3.2. Firm Size 
Corruption and other legal problems have different effects on firms depending on a firm’s size (Beck 
et al., 2005). In confronting corruption, firms with greater bargaining power may pay fewer bribes 
(Svensson, 2003). The firms were grouped by the official firm size category of the ASIP to 
investigate the effects of corruption on TFP 8 . The results with Audits as IV in regressions are 
reported in Table 8. Column (1) in Table 8 shows that the coefficient of corruption for officially 
defined “Large” firms is negative but not significant. The coefficient of corruption for the “Medium” 
firms in Column (2) and that of the “Small” firms in Column (3) are significantly negative. Overall, 
larger firms suffer little from corruption, whereas small- and medium-sized firms suffer a lot. 
 
Insert Table 8 about here 
 
4.3.3. Quantile Regressions 
Corruptions may diverge the investments and managerial efforts of the firm from innovative 
activities to non-innovative activities (Paunov, 2016; Dal Bó & Rossi, 2007), but the marginal TFP 
loss may be different for firms with heterogeneous productivity. Firms are grouped by the TFP 
                                                        
8 According to the No. 17 Document of the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS [2003] No. 17) “Statistical 
Measures for the Classification of Large, Medium and Small-sized Enterprises (Interim),” enterprises that meet all 
of the following three requirements are classified as large-scale enterprises (labeled as Large in this paper): More 
than 2,000 employees are employed, sales of more than 300 million, with total assets of more than 400 million RMB. 
Enterprises that meet all of the following three requirements are listed as medium-sized enterprises (Medium in this 
paper): the number of employees up to 300,000 and sales between 30 and 300 million, total assets of 40–400 million. 
Companies that do not meet the above conditions are small businesses (Small in this paper).  
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quantiles in regressions. The results of quantile regressions with Audits as IV are reported in Table 
9. Columns (1)–(4) in Table 9 show that the coefficients of corruptions are significantly negative 
for all quantiles. On average, the magnitudes are much larger in the higher half than those in the 
lower half. Columns (1) and (2) show that the magnitudes of the highest 25% and second highest 
25% are between 0.15 and 0.20. Columns (3) and (4) show the magnitudes of the lowest 25% and 
second-lowest 25% are between 0.05 and 0.10. Column (1) shows that the magnitudes of the highest 
25% are the largest. Overall, the more productive firms suffer more TFP loss from corruption. This 
is easily understood, just like the fact that a more productive boss’ time is much expensive.  
 
Insert Table 9 about here 
 
4.4. Discussion of Mechanisms  
As mentioned in previous sections, corruption may influence firm TFP through import liberalization. 
This paper investigates this channel by including the import liberalization indexes on the right side 
of Equation (1), as follows: 
 
1 2it pt pt ijt i p j t itTFP Corruption Corruption ImportLib Xβ β β ε ε ε ε ε= + ∗ + + + + ∗ +  (2) 
 
Two kinds of measures are used to capture the mechanism of import liberalization (ImportLib) 
on firm TFP. First, input tariff (ITariff) and output tariff (YTariff) at CIC4 industry level are 
measured respectively in Equation (2). Second, different types of imports at the firm level are 
measured (TM, firm-level total imports; InteM, firm-level imports of intermediate goods; CapiM, 
firm-level import of capital goods; MateM, firm-level imports of raw materials; and ConsM, firm-
level imports of household consumption goods). All measures are used in the natural logarithm form 
in regressions. Tables 10 and 11 report the results of regressions with Audits as IV, respectively. 
Table 10 shows the results of industry-level import liberalization measures. Firstly, for the input 
import liberalization, Column (1) shows that the coefficient of corruption is significantly negative, 
that of input import liberalization is significantly negative, and of the interaction term is significantly 
positive. On average, the reduction of industry-level input tariff has a positive effect on firm TFP, 
but the productivity gains will be reduced by corruption. These are confirmed by the results in 
Column (3) of POEs and the results in Column (4) of FIEs. However, Column (2) shows that the 
coefficients of corruption, industry-level input import tariff, and the interaction term are not 
significant for SOEs. Preliminarily, the SOEs enjoy relatively good accessibility to inputs even when 
there are cases of corruption, so the import liberalization has no obvious effect on TFP. Secondly, 
Column (1) also shows that the coefficient of output import liberalization is significantly positive 
and that of the interaction term with corruption is significantly negative. On average, the reduction 
of industry-level output import tariff has negative effect on firm TFP, but the loss may be mitigated 
by corruption. Again, these are confirmed by the results in Column (3) of POEs and the results in 
Column (4) of FIEs but not by the results in Column (2) of SOEs. Overall, the results in Table 10 
confirm that the TFP gains received from import liberalization accept negative impacts from 
corruption, especially for private and foreign firms. 
 
Insert Table 10 about here 
 
Table 11 shows the results with more firm-level import information in regressions. Columns 
(1) and (2) show the coefficients of corruption are significantly negative for both importing and non-
importing firms. The magnitude of non-importing firms is larger than those of the importing firms. 
To probe how TFP is further influenced by corruption, more firm-level import information is 
regressed. For such firm-level import information availability, the sample is limited to importing 
firms only through columns (3) and (4). Column (3) shows that the coefficient of a firm’s total 
imports is significantly positive and that of the interaction terms with corruption is significantly 
negative. On average, importing has a positive effect on firm TFP at the micro level, but corruption 
dampens the productivity gains. Column (4) includes more detailed firm importing-category 
information in regressions. The results show that the coefficients of all categories of imports are 
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positive, that of intermediate goods, imports, capital goods, and household consumption goods are 
significant, whereas that of raw material imports is not. The coefficient of corruption of the 
interaction terms with different categories of imports is significantly negative for imports of 
intermediate goods, whereas the others are not significant. On average, the importing of 
intermediate goods, capital goods, and household consumption goods has a positive effect on firm 
TFP, whereas the effect of raw material importation is negative. More intermediate goods imported 
by the firm equals more productivity gained by the firm, but the gains will be reduced by corruption. 
The results confirm those in previous sections and are robust.  
 
Insert Table 11 about here 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper first addressed a gap in literature by examining the relation between domestic corruption 
and firms’ productivity gains for China with consideration of firm heterogeneity. Using China’s 
firm-level data along with subjective corruption measures at the provincial level, the corruption was 
found to have a significant negative effect on firm’s TFP. The SOEs suffered little, whereas FIEs 
suffered to some degree, but POEs suffered the most from corruption. There is no significant 
difference in the negative effects of corruption on firm’s TFP for exporting and non-exporting firms. 
Larger firms are relatively safe from the effects of corruption, but small- and medium-sized firms 
tend to suffer more productivity loss due to corruption. Quantile regressions show that more 
productive firms suffer more productivity loss from corruptions, whereas lesser productive firms 
suffer relatively less. 
More importantly, in the era of free trade, taking advantage of imported intermediate goods 
and services in production has become an important way for firms to improve productivity and cope 
with increasingly fierce competition in both domestic and international markets. However, the 
extent to which firms can benefit from import liberalization depends not only on their own efforts 
but also on the domestic institutional environment and factors such as the corruption level of the 
government, in which firms are involved or related. This paper found that the higher the degree of 
provincial corruption, the lower the productivity gains from import liberalization. Both evidences 
from industry-level and firm-level measures show that input import liberalization improves firm 
productivity, but the productivity gains will be significantly reduced by domestic corruption. Micro 
evidence from firm-level imports in different categories confirms that importing results in 
productivity gains, especially the import of intermediate goods, but those gains will be diminished 
by corruption. 
Our finding implies that China can gain more productivity improvement from import 
liberalization if more anti-corruption measures are taken. The control of regional corruption and 
import liberalization policies are all in the hands of the government but still far from firms’ 
expectations. More public policy support needs to be provided especially to private and small-sized 
firms since they are the most vulnerable to corruption in China. More generally speaking, 
developing countries may make better use of import liberalization to improve productivity by 
making their domestic institutions healthier by reducing domestic corruption, especially in such 
turbulent international environment as now, given the recent emergence of populist and protectionist 
movements. 
Additionally, various fixed effects concerning province, year, and industrial sector are used in 
all regressions with standard errors clustered at the firm level. To further deal with the potential 
endogeneity problems such as measurement error and reverse causality, instrumental variable 
regressions were applied. The government audits and personal characteristics of key anti-corruption 
institution leaders are highly relevant with respect to local corruption but have no direct influence 
on firm productivity. Accordingly, three instrumental variables for corruption indexes were 
generated, such as the amount of violations identified in government audits, provincial anti-
corruption bureau leaders’ previous experience in anti-corruption institution, and position in 
provincial government. Two-stage least square regressions were applied. The first-stage results and 
F-test values upheld the validity of the instrumental variables, whereas the second-stage results 
showed the findings to be robust. 
Finally, the impact of the recent anti-corruption campaign that Chinese government launched 
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in late 2012 was not investigated in the paper. This is mainly because 1) the empirical results in 
most existing literature concerning China’s firm-level productivity measures and corruption-related 
issues can be compared with ours as they are based on the same ASIP data with the same period 
(1998–2007) such as Brandt et al. (2012, 2017) and 2) some key variables essential for calculating 
firm productivity, such as IVA and industrial intermediate input, are missing in the ASIP data after 
2007. However, the most recent literature that investigates the impact of the anti-corruption 
campaign indirectly supports some conclusions obtained in this paper. For example, Li et al. (2018) 
find that SOEs, large firms, or politically connected firms earn lower returns than private, small, or 
non-politically connected firms as a response to the announcement of strong anti-corruption actions; 
existing local institutions play a crucial role in determining the announcement returns across firms. 
Ding et al. (2017) show that the recent anti-corruption investigations in China are associated with 
credit reallocation from less productive SOEs to more productive non-SOEs. It should be noted, 
both papers mentioned above are based on a relatively small sample size collected from the China 
Stock Market (covering 2,258 and 1,560 firms respectively), which is very different from our 
nationwide approach covering more than 200,000 firms (more than 90% of Chinese manufacturing 
output, exports, and fixed assets). Moreover, concerning the information for corruption, Li et al. 
(2018) uses an event study approach and the announcement of anti-corruption inspection to be 
conducted by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection as the event date, rather than direct 
information from corruption itself; Ding et al. (2018) restrict corruption sample to only 78 senior 
government officials who hold positions at or above deputy minister level at the central government 
and deputy governor level at the provincial government. Meanwhile, this study covers all the filed 
corruption cases in which the amount of embezzlement and bribery investigated is above 5,000 
Chinese yuan. In this sense, our paper provided more robust results with universal significance. 
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Tables 
Table 1: Variable definition 
Variable Definition Variable level 
TFP TFP measured by ACF method using CD production function Firm level 
CRPTR Corruption cases per hundred government officers Provincial level 
Ln CRPT Natural log of corruption cases Provincial level 
Ln Audits Natural log of audit money of violation Provincial level 
Ln IVA Natural log of industrial value added Firm level 
Ln KLR Natural log of capital labor ratio Firm Level 
Ln New Natural log of new products Firm level 
Ln ITariff Natural log of input tariff 
CIC4 Industry 
level 
Ln YTariff Natural log of output tariff 
CIC4 Industry 
level 
Ln TM Natural log of total imports Firm level 
Ln InteM Natural log of imports of intermediate goods Firm level 
Ln CapiM Natural log of imports of capital goods Firm level 
Ln MateM Natural log of imports of materials Firm level 
Ln ConsM Natural log of imports of consumption goods Firm level 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
stats N Mean Min Max Median 
TFP 1823872 1.076  -0.798  4.964  1.059  
CRPTR 1880602 0.534  0.038  3.080  0.381  
Ln CRPT 1880602 7.262  3.664  8.311  7.360  
Ln Audits 1880602 11.154  6.677  14.793  11.007  
Ln IVA 1636731 8.563  0.000  17.467  8.483  
Ln KLR 1856793 3.447  -6.986  14.123  3.509  
Ln New 1636733 2.397  0.000  18.516  0.000  
Ln ITariff 1880602 2.142  1.072  3.344  2.098  
Ln YTariff 1880602 2.455  0.000  4.190  2.462  
Ln TM 206996 13.018  0.693  24.528  13.427  
Ln InteM 206996 10.928  0.000  23.789  12.395  
Ln CapiM 206996 5.580  0.000  23.726  0.000  
Ln MateM 206996 1.054  0.000  22.048  0.000  
Ln ConsM 206996 4.710  0.000  21.260  0.000  
Note: For import-related variables such as Ln TM, Ln InteM etc., only observations for importers 
are reported.  
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Table 3: Baseline regression, OLS 
 (1) (2) (3) 
CRPTR -0.024*** 
(0.001) 
-0.022*** 
(0.001) 
-0.021*** 
(0.001) 
Ln IVA  
 
0.012*** 
(0.000) 
0.013*** 
(0.000) 
Ln KLR  
 
 
 
0.004*** 
(0.000) 
Ln New 0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
FE F,P,I2#Y F,P,I2#Y F,P,I2#Y 
adj. R2 0.971 0.972 0.973 
N 1484420 1484417 1466917 
Note: Standard errors clustered at firm level are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. F represents firm FE, P represents province 
FE, and I2#Y represents two-digit CIC industry by year FE.  
 
 
 
Table 4: Regression by firm type, OLS 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 SOE POE FIE 
CRPTR -0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.033*** 
(0.002) 
-0.013*** 
(0.002) 
Ln IVA -0.017*** 
(0.001) 
0.024*** 
(0.000) 
0.015*** 
(0.000) 
Ln KLR 0.015*** 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.002*** 
(0.000) 
Ln New 0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
FE F,P,I2#Y F,P,I2#Y F,P,I2#Y 
adj. R2 0.961 0.978 0.975 
N 153359 497876 317305 
Note: See the notes for Table 3.  
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Table 5: IV (Audits) result for baseline and for different firm types, first stage 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 CRPTR CRPTR CRPTR CRPTR 
 Whole SOE POE FIE 
Ln Audit -0.018*** 
(0.000) 
-0.005*** 
(0.000) 
-0.013*** 
(0.000) 
-0.022*** 
(0.000) 
Ln IVA -0.006*** 
(0.000) 
-0.017*** 
(0.001) 
-0.009*** 
(0.000) 
-0.003*** 
(0.000) 
Ln KLR -0.003*** 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.000) 
-0.004*** 
(0.000) 
Ln New 0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
0.002*** 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
FE F,P,I2#Y F,P,I2#Y F,P,I2#Y F,P,I2#Y 
F statistic 2906..04 32.21 843.14 589.64 
adj. R2 0.968 0.969 0.977 0.965 
N 1466917 153359 497876 317305 
Note: See the notes for Table 3.  
 
 
Table 6: IV (Audits) result for baseline and for different firm types, second stage 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Whole SOE POE FIE 
CRPTR -0.126*** 
(0.007) 
-0.093 
(0.101) 
-0.145*** 
(0.015) 
-0.090*** 
(0.012) 
Ln IVA 0.012*** 
(0.000) 
-0.017*** 
(0.001) 
0.023*** 
(0.000) 
0.015*** 
(0.000) 
Ln KLR 0.003*** 
(0.000) 
0.015*** 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
Ln New 0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
FE F,P,I2#Y F,P,I2#Y F,P,I2#Y F,P,I2#Y 
adj. R2 0.979 0.970 0.985 0.981 
N 1466917 153359 497876 317305 
Note: See the notes for Table 3.  
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Table 7: Results by exporting status, IV (Audits) 
 (1) (2) 
 Exporting Non-Exporting 
CRPTR -0.129*** 
(0.010) 
-0.121*** 
(0.011) 
Ln IVA 0.015*** 
(0.000) 
0.011*** 
(0.000) 
Ln KLR 0.002*** 
(0.000) 
0.004*** 
(0.000) 
Ln New 0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
FE F,P,I2#Y F,P,I2#Y 
adj. R2 0.982 0.980 
N 397420 1018922 
Note: See the notes for Table 3. 
 
 
 
Table 8: Results by firm size, IV (Audits) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Large Medium Small 
CRPTR -0.125 
(0.088) 
-0.191*** 
(0.023) 
-0.101*** 
(0.008) 
Ln IVA 0.022*** 
(0.002) 
0.015*** 
(0.001) 
0.012*** 
(0.000) 
Ln KLR 0.008*** 
(0.002) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
0.003*** 
(0.000) 
Ln New 0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
FE F,P,I2#Y F,P,I2#Y F,P,I2#Y 
adj. R2 0.989 0.988 0.981 
N 30918 123898 1177379 
Note: See the notes for Table 3. Firms are classified into large, medium and small based on the 
standards of ASIP.  
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Table 9: Quantile regressions, IV (Audits) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Q4 Q3 Q2 Q1 
CRPTR -0.190*** 
(0.020) 
-0.158*** 
(0.015) 
-0.051*** 
(0.009) 
-0.072*** 
(0.012) 
Ln IVA 0.030*** 
(0.001) 
0.012*** 
(0.000) 
0.005*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
Ln KLR 0.013*** 
(0.001) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.005*** 
(0.000) 
Ln New 0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
FE F,P,I2#Y F,P,I2#Y F,P,I2#Y F,P,I2#Y 
adj. R2 0.911 0.831 0.841 0.983 
N 334340 306679 336201 346456 
Note: See the notes for Table 3. Q4 represents the highest 25% observations according to TFP level, 
and Q1 represents the lowest 25%. 
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Table 10: Industry-level input and output tariff, IV (Audits) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Whole SOE POE FIE 
CRPTR -0.648*** 
(0.046) 
1.989 
(7.460) 
-0.477*** 
(0.059) 
-3.850*** 
(1.078) 
CRPTR*Ln ITariff 0.189*** 
(0.014) 
-0.389 
(1.596) 
0.127*** 
(0.020) 
1.079*** 
(0.309) 
CRPTR*Ln YTariff -0.014*** 
(0.004) 
-0.045 
(0.028) 
0.001 
(0.008) 
0.014 
(0.012) 
Ln ITariff -0.060*** 
(0.009) 
0.297 
(0.937) 
-0.023 
(0.015) 
-0.500*** 
(0.152) 
Ln YTariff 0.005** 
(0.002) 
0.017 
(0.011) 
-0.005 
(0.005) 
-0.014** 
(0.006) 
Ln IVA 0.012*** 
(0.000) 
-0.016*** 
(0.002) 
0.024*** 
(0.000) 
0.014*** 
(0.001) 
Ln KLR 0.004*** 
(0.000) 
0.016*** 
(0.002) 
0.001* 
(0.000) 
0.002*** 
(0.001) 
Ln New 0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
FE F,P,I2#Y F,P,I2#Y F,P,I2#Y F,P,I2#Y 
adj. R2 0.968 0.884 0.977 0.893 
N 1439546 146552 490474 310450 
Note: See the notes for Table 3. 
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Table 11: Firm-level imports in different types, IV (Audits) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Importing Non-Importing Importing Importing 
CRPTR -0.058*** 
(0.011) 
-0.116*** 
(0.008) 
-0.012 
(0.012) 
-0.040*** 
(0.013) 
CRPTR*Ln TM  
 
 
 
-0.003*** 
(0.001) 
 
 
CRPTR*Ln InteM  
 
 
 
 
 
-0.001** 
(0.001) 
CRPTR*Ln CapiM  
 
 
 
 
 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
CRPTR*Ln MateM  
 
 
 
 
 
0.001 
(0.001) 
CRPTR*Ln ConsM  
 
 
 
 
 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
Ln TM  
 
 
 
0.002*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
Ln InteM  
 
 
 
 
 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
Ln CapiM  
 
 
 
 
 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
Ln MateM  
 
 
 
 
 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Ln ConsM  
 
 
 
 
 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
Ln IVA 0.015*** 
(0.001) 
0.012*** 
(0.000) 
0.014*** 
(0.001) 
0.014*** 
(0.001) 
Ln KLR 0.002** 
(0.001) 
0.004*** 
(0.000) 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
Ln New 0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
FE F,P,I2#Y F,P,I2#Y F,P,I2#Y F,P,I2#Y 
adj. R2 0.979 0.972 0.979 0.979 
N 140088 1268928 140088 140088 
Note: See the notes for Table 3. 
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Appendix Table 1: Baseline regression re-estimated with Ln CRPT, OLS 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Ln CRPT -0.020*** 
(0.001) 
-0.018*** 
(0.001) 
-0.018*** 
(0.001) 
Ln IVA  
 
0.012*** 
(0.000) 
0.013*** 
(0.000) 
Ln KLR  
 
 
 
0.004*** 
(0.000) 
Ln New 0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
FE F,P,I2#Y F,P,I2#Y F,P,I2#Y 
adj. R2 0.971 0.972 0.973 
N 1484420 1484417 1466917 
See the notes for Table 3. 
 
Appendix Table 2: Regression by firm type re-estimated with Ln CRPT, OLS 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 SOE POE FIE 
Ln CRPT -0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.033*** 
(0.002) 
-0.018*** 
(0.002) 
Ln IVA -0.017*** 
(0.001) 
0.025*** 
(0.000) 
0.015*** 
(0.000) 
Ln KLR 0.015*** 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.002*** 
(0.000) 
Ln New 0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
FE F,P,I2#Y F,P,I2#Y F,P,I2#Y 
adj. R2 0.961 0.978 0.975 
N 153359 497876 317305 
Note: See the notes for Table 3.  
  
20 
 
Appendix Table 3: IV (Audits) result for baseline and for different firm types re-estimated 
using Ln CRPT, first stage 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Ln CRPT Ln CRPT Ln CRPT Ln CRPT 
 Whole SOE POE FIE 
Ln Audit -0.030*** 
(0.000) 
-0.010*** 
(0.001) 
-0.034*** 
(0.000) 
-0.032*** 
(0.000) 
Ln IVA -0.002*** 
(0.000) 
-0.002*** 
(0.000) 
-0.004*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
Ln KLR -0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.002*** 
(0.001) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
Ln New 0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
FE F,P,I2#Y F,P,I2#Y F,P,I2#Y F,P,I2#Y 
F statistic 8280.79 84.86 5024.48 1970.86 
adj. R2 0.983 0.982 0.984 0.984 
N 1466917 153359 497876 317305 
Note: See the notes for Table 3.  
 
Appendix Table 4: IV (Audits) result for baseline and for different firm types re-estimated 
using Ln CRPT, second stage 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Whole SOE POE FIE 
Ln CRPT -0.076*** 
(0.004) 
-0.047 
(0.051) 
-0.055*** 
(0.006) 
-0.061*** 
(0.008) 
Ln IVA 0.013*** 
(0.000) 
-0.017*** 
(0.001) 
0.024*** 
(0.000) 
0.015*** 
(0.000) 
Ln KLR 0.004*** 
(0.000) 
0.015*** 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.002*** 
(0.000) 
Ln New 0.000*** 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
FE F,P,I2#Y F,P,I2#Y F,P,I2#Y F,P,I2#Y 
adj. R2 0.980 0.970 0.985 0.981 
N 1466917 153359 497876 317305 
Note: See the notes for Table 3.  
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Appendix Table 5: Using R&D instead of new products 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Whole SOE POE FIE 
CRPTR -0.134*** 
(0.009) 
0.107** 
(0.052) 
-0.509*** 
(0.055) 
-0.052*** 
(0.011) 
Ln IVA 0.017*** 
(0.000) 
-0.009*** 
(0.002) 
0.020*** 
(0.001) 
0.015*** 
(0.001) 
Ln KLR -0.000 
(0.000) 
0.014*** 
(0.002) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
Ln R&D 0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.002*** 
(0.001) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
FE F,P,I2#Y F,P,I2#Y F,P,I2#Y F,P,I2#Y 
adj. R2 0.986 0.976 0.984 0.986 
N 778235 27907 359575 177462 
See the notes for Table 3. 
 
Appendix Table 6: Deputy Secretary of the Provincial Party Committee used as IV 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Whole SOE POE FIE 
CRPTR -0.019** 
(0.008) 
0.137*** 
(0.040) 
-0.052*** 
(0.014) 
0.035* 
(0.020) 
Ln IVA 0.013*** 
(0.000) 
-0.017*** 
(0.001) 
0.024*** 
(0.000) 
0.016*** 
(0.000) 
Ln KLR 0.004*** 
(0.000) 
0.015*** 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.002*** 
(0.000) 
Ln New 0.000*** 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
FE F,P,I2#Y F,P,I2#Y F,P,I2#Y F,P,I2#Y 
adj. R2 0.980 0.970 0.985 0.981 
N 1466917 153359 497876 317305 
See the notes for Table 3. 
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Appendix Table 7: Previous working experiences used as IV 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Whole SOE POE FIE 
CRPTR -0.035*** 
(0.004) 
0.004 
(0.016) 
-0.072*** 
(0.004) 
-0.018* 
(0.010) 
Ln IVA 0.013*** 
(0.000) 
-0.017*** 
(0.001) 
0.024*** 
(0.000) 
0.015*** 
(0.000) 
Ln KLR 0.004*** 
(0.000) 
0.015*** 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.002*** 
(0.000) 
Ln New 0.000*** 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
FE F,P,I2#Y F,P,I2#Y F,P,I2#Y F,P,I2#Y 
adj. R2 0.980 0.970 0.985 0.981 
N 1466917 153359 497876 317305 
See the notes for Table 3. 
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